Sri Lanka’s foreign policy swing? Not really

• Relations with China are deeply internalised by the ruling core, the Rajapaksas, no other large state seemed to have given them a sense of personal fulfillment, that the mandarins in Beijing are willing to accord
• Economic dependency due to a life and death situation as the Sri Lankan economy is placed at, would cultivate long term geopolitical affiliations

Recently, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is showing a newly dawned wisdom. Some observers consider it as a swing from China to the West and India. The recent twist in the foreign policy is highlighted by several key events. First, India’s Adani ports signed an agreement with the government to jointly develop a deep water terminal in Colombo port with its local partner, John Keells Holdings. The Indian conglomerate will hold the majority stake of 51 per cent of the new Colombo West Terminal under the 35-year Build Owned and Transfer agreement. At a total investment of US$  650 million, this would make India the largest investor in Colombo port though China’s state-owned China Port Merchants own 85 per cent of Colombo International Terminal, also under a 35-year lease.

The second development is a deal sealed by the American company New Fortress Energy to build an offshore LNG terminal and to supply gas to the Kerawalapitiya power plant for the next 15 years. The New Fortress will also buy a 40 per cent stake of West Coast Power which owns the 300 MW Yugadanavi power plant. 

 The third is the visit by Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, who during his four days in Sri Lanka visited Jaffna, oil tank farm in Trinco, which is at the centre of a dispute between Sri Lanka and India and reminded the government of Sri Lanka that India wants to see the full implementation of the 13th Amendment. 
Each of these developments is not exactly new or fundamentally path defining. Adani Ports were given the Western terminal as the consolation prize after the government backtracked on a previous government to government agreement for the joint development of the Colombo port’s Eastern terminal. New Delhi was livid at the snub, which Colombo explained in the trade union pressure.

New Fortress local advent happened after it submitted an unsolicited proposal through the American Embassy, which has often raised concerns over the lack of transparency in doing business with the Sri Lankan government. Intriguingly, though almost every bid should undergo a competitive tender process at the CEB, this particular proposal didn’t. How the government granted New Fortress a virtual monopoly to supply LP gas for the next fifteen years will be debated for many years to come. Probably, having snubbed the United States, earlier through its rejection of the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s US$ 480 million grant, the ruling regime in Colombo sought to cosy up to Washington in its own style, or so they calculated. 

When the Indian foreign secretary took the liberty to remind President Gotabaya Rajapaksa of the Indian interest in the 13th Amendment, the usual culprits who would have run havoc at the sight of such a perceived indignity were starkly silent.  So were they when the government sealed the deal with New Fortress Energy, probably because some of the most vocal fear mongers such as Wimal Weerawansa and  Gammanpila etc have fallen out of the favour of the Rajapaksas and are fighting their own battle for political survival. 
Even the slightest whimper of dissent from the ruling party sounded a lot more enlightened than it used to be, raising concerns about the implications on energy security when the government hands over the monopoly of gas supply to a foreign company. 

What do these developments tell about the foreign policy, if any?  Do they signify a swing from China to India and the West, as some commentators, who see geopolitics in every domestic move, wishing to describe?
Are they a sign of a new found sense of foreign policy maturity of a government, which has muddied its every conceivable foreign policy decision with a toxic mix of ignorance, inflated personal egos, and miscalculations of Sri Lanka’s place in international politics, not to mention, ripple effect of some of the ill-thought-out domestic policies?
This is hardly a detachment from China for multiple reasons. First, relations with China are deeply internalised by the ruling core, the Rajapaksas, no other large state seemed to have given them a sense of personal fulfillment, that the mandarins in Beijing are willing to accord. So-called none interference of internal affairs is a pillar of China’s five principles of foreign policy.

With the Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights stepping up the calls for accountability over war crimes, Sri Lanka’s dalliance with the USA, and even India would be short lived. China would be the one the Rajapaksas would turn to help. Second, the economic dependency of Sri Lanka on China is deep rooted. The government is disinclined to go to an IMF programme for debt restructuring. This leaves it to dig deeper into China’s largess. Sri Lanka’s current fiscal troubles are so wretched, that decisions it makes might redefine its geo political affiliations. The current trajectory of the Rajapaksa government leads it deeper into China’s economic orbit. Economic dependency due to a life and death situation as the Sri Lankan economy is placed at, would cultivate long term geopolitical affiliations.Recent developments are not necessarily a sign of foreign policy maturity of navigating the geopolitics of Sri Lanka’s external environment. 

There is a third factor that is far more decisive. Interestingly, in most small states like Sri Lanka, whose survival is given by the existing norms and regimes in international politics, whims and fancies and personal calculations of their larger than life size leaders have a far more decisive role in dictating foreign policy than external pressure of systemic factors.
The recent developments should be viewed as such. They do not signify a major shift away from China or into India, or for that matter to America.

Rather, Basil Rajapaksa, being industrious of the Rajapaksa brothers might have calculated cosying up to each of them would help the self-preservation of the regime.
Also, the economic conditions are dire and China might not have been inclined to come the extra mile to rescue – as the government leaders might have expected. The same folly was on the Yahapalanaya regime which believed America would bail it out from excess debt. That calls for the diversification of relations to whoever is willing to throw a bone. 

So one should not have misgivings of a major foreign policy shift in the recent developments. Probably, even the decisions that are taken out of pure personal self interest, and existential factors of economic rot, can make things better in the long term. In Sri Lanka’s case, they might help diversify the foreign relations and attachments from a single country. If that happens, that is in the interest of the country.

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