State capture: Lal Kantha’s prescription not valid

Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recent remarks on ‘state capture’ have struck a chord in the country. The Government is unable to perform at the desired pace because the country’s institutional mechanism is not fully cooperative with it.

In fact, the State has, over decades, been captured by narrow political and business interests, hollowing out public institutions and eroding public trust. The people’s verdict during the 2022 uprising and subsequent elections was, in many ways, an indictment of this very capture.

Only countries with robust institutional mechanisms have developed. As such, there is a need for correction in Sri Lanka. Actually, people expected it from this Government. However, the minister’s remarks cannot be validated. 

Lal Kantha’s rhetoric, and the broader ideological direction of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), increasingly suggests that the antidote to state capture lies in a highly centralised, ideologically driven, single-party model of governance. That proposition is not only impractical but fundamentally incompatible with Sri Lanka’s democratic fabric.

State capture is one specific matter but replacing captured institutions with politically subordinated ones is not reform, it is merely a change of captors. Sri Lanka’s post-independence experience offers ample evidence of how excessive concentration of power, regardless of ideology, leads to abuse. Executive over-reach, politicisation of the bureaucracy, erosion of independent commissions and the weakening of the Parliament did not occur because the country lacked revolutionary zeal. They occurred because checks and balances were systematically dismantled in the name of efficiency, stability or national interest. A one-party or one-ideology dominance, whether clothed in nationalist, populist or socialist language, only accelerates this erosion.

The JVP’s ideological roots in orthodox Marxism-Leninism, though softened in rhetoric over the years, still reveal a deep discomfort with pluralism. The emphasis on discipline, ideological conformity and centralised decision-making may resonate within party structures, but governance of a modern, diverse society demands compromise, institutional autonomy and respect for dissent. Sri Lanka is not a revolutionary state emerging from colonial collapse or civil war victory under a single banner. It is a deeply plural society ethnic, religious, political and economic where stability depends on inclusion, not ideological uniformity.

The danger in the minister ’s framing of state capture is that it subtly delegitimises all non-aligned institutions. In functioning democracies, institutions are not purified by loyalty tests; they are strengthened by transparency, accountability and legal safeguards. It is worth recalling that some of the worst forms of state capture in Sri Lanka occurred under governments that commanded overwhelming parliamentary majorities. When power became absolute, corruption became systemic. Therefore, the solution cannot be to place even more power in fewer hands, regardless of how ‘clean’ or ‘disciplined’ those hands claim to be.

Sri Lanka’s current recovery depends on re-engagement with the global economy. Debt restructuring, export growth, investment inflows and technology transfers are not ideological choices; they are economic necessities. A governance model that signals hostility to private enterprise, suspicion of markets and excessive state control will only deepen isolation and discourage long-term investment. No country has sustainably lifted itself from crisis through ideological rigidity alone.

This is neither an argument against reform, nor is it a defence of the old political order that brought the country to its knees. Sri Lanka urgently needs to dismantle patronage networks, depoliticise institutions, strengthen the rule of law and ensure that public resources serve public interest. But these reforms require independent courts, empowered regulators, a free media and a Parliament capable of oversight not a political culture that equates criticism with sabotage. The minister is right to speak about state capture. It is a conversation Sri Lanka must have, honestly and urgently. But the conversation cannot end with the assumption that one party, one ideology or one political movement possesses the moral authority to remake the State in its own image. History both local and global offers sobering lessons about where such assumptions lead.

Sri Lanka does not need a communist straitjacket or an ideological monoculture. It needs democratic renewal: stronger institutions, clearer rules, ethical leadership and an engaged citizenry capable of holding all governments accountable, whether they are left, right or centre. The challenge is not to replace one form of capture with another, but to build a State that belongs to its people, not to any single party or political creed. 

In the end, the true test of anti-state capture politics is not how loudly it condemns the past, but how carefully it protects the future.