Government Must Listen to the Legal Fraternity

The independence of the judiciary is one of the cornerstones of a functioning democracy. It is not merely a constitutional principle but a safeguard against the abuse of executive and legislative power. Any move that affects the structure, composition, or tenure of the judiciary must therefore be approached with utmost caution, transparency, and broad consultation.

The government’s proposal to extend the retirement age of Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges has triggered strong opposition from the legal fraternity. While the government may argue that the proposal is intended to retain experienced judges and address judicial delays, the concerns raised by the legal community deserve serious consideration.

Public confidence in the judiciary depends not only on the actual independence of judges,  but also on the perception that judges are free from political influence. Any constitutional amendment concerning judges’ tenure introduced at a time when specific judges stand to benefit inevitably creates questions about motive. Even if the government’s intentions are entirely genuine, the timing alone can undermine public trust.

The legal fraternity’s concerns stem from this fundamental principle. Laws should never be tailored to suit individuals currently holding office. Instead, constitutional reforms should be prospective, applying to future appointments rather than current officeholders. This approach eliminates any perception that constitutional changes are designed to favour particular individuals.

Sri Lanka has painful historical lessons regarding attempts to weaken independent institutions. The constitutional changes introduced under the 18th Amendment significantly expanded executive power at the expense of institutional checks and balances. Subsequent constitutional reforms, particularly the 19th Amendment, sought to restore those safeguards. Although later amendments altered the balance once again, the importance of preserving judicial independence has remained a central constitutional objective.

Unlike ordinary public servants, judges occupy a unique constitutional position. Their security of tenure is deliberately protected to ensure that they can decide cases without fear or favour. Altering the terms of their service while they remain in office raises serious constitutional and ethical questions. 

Many democratic countries have fixed judicial retirement ages. Some have chosen to increase those limits over time to reflect longer life expectancy and improved health. However, such reforms are usually implemented after extensive consultation with judges, bar associations, constitutional experts, and civil society. More importantly, they often apply only to future judicial appointments, avoiding conflicts of interest. If the government believes that the retirement age genuinely requires revision due to demographic or institutional reasons, there is a legitimate pathway. It should establish an independent constitutional review process, invite public submissions, consult the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, retired judges, academics, and legal experts, and present a comprehensive rationale supported by comparative international experience. 

The legal profession is not opposing change for the sake of opposition. Lawyers interact daily with the justice system and understand both its strengths and its shortcomings. Their objections arise from concerns about constitutional integrity rather than personal or political interests. Ignoring these voices risks creating unnecessary confrontation between the executive and one of the country’s most respected professional communities.

The government has consistently pledged to strengthen democratic governance, restore public trust, and uphold the rule of law. Listening to the legal fraternity would be entirely consistent with those commitments. Consultation is not a sign of weakness. Judicial reforms should unite the nation around stronger institutions, not divide it through suspicion and controversy. If the objective is truly to improve the administration of justice, the government should pursue reforms that command broad public confidence instead of those that generate doubts about judicial independence.

Constitutional amendments are among the most consequential decisions any government can make. They outlast political administrations and shape the nation’s democratic future. That is precisely why they require consensus, careful deliberation, and unwavering respect for constitutional principles.

The government still has an opportunity to pause, engage with the legal fraternity, and build agreement on a reform that serves the long-term interests of the judiciary rather than the immediate interests of any administration. In matters affecting the courts, caution is not an obstacle to reform—it is its strongest guarantee. An independent judiciary is too precious to become the subject of avoidable political controversy. The government would do well to remember that protecting judicial independence today protects democracy itself tomorrow.