The detractors of the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime (2004-2015) are fond of saying that the then President had an abyssmal record when it came to international relations. If such things are to be judged by approbation and contempt from high seats of global power, then they are not off the mark.
Sri Lanka, especially after 2009 earned the wrath of the United States and her allies as well as International NGOs more or less aligned to Washington. These forces moved UN agencies, especially the Human Rights Commission, against Sri Lanka. The culmination of such efforts, ironically with the backing of individuals who had arrogated upon themselves the powers of representation, was Resolution 30/1, co-sponsored by the USA and Sri Lanka.
The 2015-2019 period saw a perceptible shift in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. There was a perception that the Rajapaksa regime was too ‘China-friendly’. The Yahapalana regime, from Day One, opted to bank with ‘The West’. The belief was that the US and Europe would bail out Sri Lanka in exchange for submission to the US version of Sri Lanka’s reality. It didn’t happen. At one point, especially after the Brexit vote, then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe famously said ‘We will look East’. Obviously he meant China and perhaps India.
On November 16, 2019 there was a regime change. Less than two weeks after he was elected, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa visited India. That was his first official overseas visit. It must be noted here that the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, was the first leader to visit Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the Easter Sunday attacks. The air of goodwill is of course a positive sign. It is also good that President Rajapaksa has chosen to say it as it is, especially regarding the 13th Amendment. Honesty is good — it leaves little room for misinterpretation, honest or devious.
India, important as it is for Sri Lanka given geopolitical realities as well as economic concerns, is not the only significant country in the foreign relations map. There is the much talked of Chinese footprint, first made apparent during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure and ever more visible in the Yahapalana years, contrary to expectations raised by the anti-China rhetoric of the United National Party.
We also have the USA. There is ACSA, there is SOFA and there’s the MCC Compact. Obviously there is ‘give and take’ in these matters. ‘Friendship’ is a sweetener. Good for rhetoric. It’s the details that count.
Now if Sri Lanka was not strategically important to any of these countries, things would have been easier. However, all three nations mentioned above do have security and economic concerns with respect to Sri Lanka. Each of them takes note of the other two and their play in/with Sri Lanka because to a greater or lesser degree such things can impact their own national interests. If Sri Lanka could tell all these countries to mind their own business, then foreign policy wouldn’t be like walking on eggshells. That however is exactly what Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government is forced to do.
The President is not, at this point, playing one against the other. Neither is he indicating that Sri Lanka has friendship preferences. Quite apart from the ‘diplomatic’ statements on foreign policy in his manifesto, the President has made it clear to one and all that if there are concerns about this country or that country’s footprint in Sri Lanka, the answer would be to invest. Put money where the mouth is, so to speak.
However, things rarely pan out as planned or envisaged. There are no ideal circumstances. Arms are twisted. Cheques are cashed. That’s the political economy of international relations. China has the bucks. India is next door. The USA has guns. Each country has interests. Each holds trumps.
The question is, ‘what does Sri Lanka have?’
The people; first and foremost. Secondly, the truth of a strategic location. Third, a leader who is unafraid to call a spade a spade and is firmly committed to a Sri Lanka with Sri Lankans and for Sri Lankans. These things can change. People change. Loyalties decline. Popularity can plummet. These things can be made to happen too. The USA, for example, is the global expert at such things. Such things have to be kept in mind too.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa could, of course, bet on one (or more) and earn the ire of others (and pay the relevant prices). That would be a disaster, as the history of the world has demonstrated many a time. He could, on the other hand, choose to keep the nation intact by way of showing absolute commitment to delivering promises and being absolutely honest with the citizenry. If he chooses that path, then he would be better able to balance the key international players in the sphere of foreign relations.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa has his work cut out in an unforgiving international environment. He must trust the country. He must trust his people.
