Is independence from political influence overrated?

The rationale for independence is stronger for institutions like universities, where people look for ideas and for evidence-based criticism, than for commercial regulators like gambling authorities. Pictured is the University Grants Commission in Colombo. FILE PHOTO

• The 17th Amendment to the Constitution introduced the Constitutional Council
• The earliest example of a semi-independent institution is the UGC, created in 1978

Sri Lankans, at least those who engage with the esoterica of lawmaking, appear to think highly of independence from political influence. The 17th Amendment to the Constitution which was forced on President Kumaratunga by the JVP in 2001 introduced the novel institution of the Constitutional Council. 
The independence of certain designated officeholders (e.g., judges of the superior courts) and commissions (e.g., the Elections Commission) was to be assured by making appointments subject to the approval of the Constitutional Council and by making removal difficult. The Removal of Officers (Procedure) Act, No. 5 of 2002, enacted shortly thereafter, reinforced these provisions. 
The basic concept survived repeated assaults by the Rajapaksas and has now become part of the Sri Lankan constitutional fabric. For example, the government committed to making appointments to the Online Safety Commission subject to Constitutional Council approval when the bill was challenged. Demands are being made for similar appointment procedures for the Gambling Regulatory Authority, which is essentially a cartel manager whose purpose is to ensure the government gets a good share of the gambling revenue by barring entry by additional operators.
The earliest independent commission
The practice of shielding institutions from political influence did not start with the 17th Amendment. The Universities Act, No. 16 of 1978, enacted shortly after the current Constitution was adopted, may be the precursor. The seven members of the University Grants Commission (UGC) are appointed by the President, without having to obtain concurrence from a body not under the President. Thus, it lacks a key element of independence. But there is no language about serving at pleasure. Except for a passing reference to removal (section 5(1)), it seems to imply security of tenure. 
More importantly, the Act empowers Councils to manage the affairs of the universities under the UGC: “The Council of a University shall be the executive body and governing authority of the University”. It is constituted by ex-officio members such as the Vice-Chancellor and deans, who are outnumbered by appointed members: “persons who have rendered distinguished service in educational, professional, commercial, industrial, scientific or administrative spheres”. These appointed members cannot be removed unless they fail to attend meetings. In addition to being the overall governing authority, they shortlist the candidates for Vice Chancellor, from among whom the President may appoint one. All university appointments are made by the Council. There is no role for the Minister or political authorities.
It appears that those responsible for this almost 50-year-old law wanted to give at least a semblance of independence to those working within state universities. If this law were enacted in this decade, it is likely that the UGC members would have to be appointed with the approval of the Constitutional Council.
The case for shielding universities from political meddling is much stronger than that for protecting gambling regulators. Universities are where people look for ideas and for evidence-based criticism. Ideally, university academics should not have to worry about being thrown on the street for speaking truth to power.
Actual practice
But what value is independence when those shielded from political pressure are themselves pawns of politicians? From the time of Professor Stanley Kalpage, the first chairman of the UGC, that position has been occupied by an academic from a state university appointed by the President, sans any checks and balances. But the UGC members were protected from arbitrary removal so some degree of academic independence could be expected. They, in turn, appointed a majority of the members of university councils who governed the universities. 
When the Chairman of the University Grants Commission, appointed by the current President, asked for the resignations of the members of a university council I served on, I responded, pointing to the provisions governing the appointment and removal of council members. His response was that he “acknowledged and agreed” with those provisions but that I should resign “in support of the current initiative of the government”. I complied, stating that “the 1978 Act sought to provide independence to scholars working within state universities, to people like you. That university academics are aligning themselves with politicians to subvert the intent of the 1978 legislation is evidence that independence is no longer valued or needed”.
So, the crux of the matter is how important insulation from political influence is to university academics. When President Trump tries to remove the Chairman of the Federal Reserve (equivalent to our Central Bank), the markets react because they place value on the independence of those setting the country’s monetary policy. I have seen no evidence of any interest in the independence of universities among the intended beneficiaries. 
It may be useful to look at what happens in supposedly independent commissions before we rush to create more independent bodies. It may well be that independence is overrated.