Transactional alliances: How Pakistan lost the trust of Its partners

The historical evolution of Pakistan’s foreign policy illustrates a persistent and ingrained trend -  alliances are frequently viewed as tools of convenience rather than as firm commitments.

From the alignments of the Cold War to the current geopolitical landscape of West Asia, Islamabad has consistently adjusted its responsibilities when faced with domestic challenges or changing strategic motivations. The escalating tensions with Saudi Arabia, now further complicated by disputes with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, serve as a telling contemporary example of this lasting trend.

At the heart of the Saudi situation is a reported request for Pakistan to repay around USD 6.3 billion in financial aids, an unusually straightforward indication of dissatisfaction from a long-term strategic ally1. This comes in the wake of Islamabad’s perceived inability to fulfill its obligations under the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), which was formalized in Riyadh in September, 2025. This agreement solidified decades of military collaboration, encompassing provisions for troop deployment, intelligence-sharing, and mutual deterrence.

Saudi Arabia’s expectations were grounded in historical context. As noted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Islamabad Pakistani military personnel have been stationed in Saudi Arabia in various roles since the 1960s, particularly during times of regional unrest. This longstanding arrangement cultivated an unspoken understanding that Pakistan would serve as a security guarantor when necessary.

Nevertheless, during the recent escalation involving Iran and broader regional tensions, Pakistan reportedly chose not to deploy troops or provide direct military assistance, despite the expectations set forth by the SMDA framework. Instead, it confined its involvement to diplomatic maneuvers. Concurrently, Islamabad has been in discussions to convert approximately $5 billion of Saudi deposits into a long-term facility-effectively postponing repayment obligations while sidestepping security commitments.

The gap between economic reliance and strategic non-compliance has put a considerable strain on the trust between nations. Analysts from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observe that Pakistan’s hesitance to engage in military actions stems from domestic political sensitivities and an overstretched security apparatus. However, from Riyadh’s viewpoint, this situation highlights a growing sense of unreliability.

This feeling of unreliability is not limited to Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates, another crucial financial supporter of Pakistan, has reportedly also requested the return of loans given to Islamabad, with repayment timelines becoming more stringent, including deadlines set for April. Historically, the UAE has played a vital role in providing financial aid, such as deposits in Pakistan’s central bank and assistance during balance-of-payments crises. As noted in IMF country reports and analyses from the Gulf, this support has frequently been key in stabilizing Pakistan’s external financial situation.

The tightening of financial expectations from both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi indicates a significant shift: Gulf partners seem increasingly reluctant to offer unconditional support without a corresponding level of strategic reliability. This represents a break from previous trends where financial aid was often given with an implicit understanding of geopolitical interests rather than strict conditions.

Adding to Pakistan’s diplomatic hurdles is Qatar’s reported decision to withdraw or suspend visa-on-arrival privileges for Pakistani citizens8. While such actions are usually presented in administrative or regulatory contexts, they carry substantial diplomatic implications. Qatar is home to a large Pakistani expatriate community, and restrictions on mobility of this kind often signal deeper concerns, ranging from migration management to broader bilateral tensions.

Taken together, these developments indicate a coordinated, albeit informal, reassessment of the Gulf states’ interactions with Pakistan. Financial influence, labour mobility, and security collaboration are being reconsidered concurrently, suggesting that Islamabad’s credibility issues are no longer viewed as isolated but rather as a collective concern among various partners.

Importantly, this current situation mirrors past events. In 2015, when Saudi Arabia requested Pakistan’s involvement in its Yemen intervention, Islamabad refused after parliamentary discussions, citing internal factors. The Brookings Institution highlighted that this decision represented a pivotal moment in Saudi-Pakistani relations, introducing a level of strategic uncertainty that continues to this day.
Beyond the Gulf, Pakistan’s alliance behavior has consistently demonstrated a trend of selective engagement.

The relationship with the United States stands out as one of the most thoroughly documented instances. Throughout the Cold War, Pakistan aligned itself with U.S.-led security frameworks, receiving significant military and economic support. However, this partnership was compromised by Pakistan’s pursuit of a covert nuclear programme, which conflicted with U.S. non-proliferation goals.

The later revelation of proliferation networks associated with Abdul Qadeer Khan further diminished trust. Assessments from the International Atomic Energy Agency indicated that parts of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure were implicated in the transfer of sensitive technology to various nations, raising serious questions about adherence to global non-proliferation standards.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan once again took on the role of a key U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism. However, numerous reports from the Congressional Research Service have highlighted a trend of selective cooperation, where certain militant groups are targeted while others, deemed strategically beneficial, are tolerated.

his dual approach has significantly complicated U.S. goals in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s relationship with China, often described as an ‘all-weather partnership,’ also exposes underlying tensions. Although the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has drawn considerable investment, widespread corruption and ongoing attacks on Chinese nationals have raised alarms in Beijing. Research from the United States Institute of Peace emphasizes the ongoing security challenges surrounding CPEC projects, highlighting Pakistan’s struggles to ensure a stable investment climate. It is also noteworthy to mention Lieutenant General Asim Saleem Bajwa, who led the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Authority from November 2019 to August 2021. He was often mockingly referred to as the ‘Pizza General’ due to his family’s ownership of the Papa John’s pizza franchise in the USA, with allegations suggesting that the franchise was established using funds from Bajwa’s corrupt practices.

The situation in Afghanistan is crucial for understanding Pakistan’s strategic calculations. For many years, Islamabad has aimed to influence political developments in Afghanistan as part of its quest for ‘strategic depth.’ While it publicly endorses peace efforts, it has faced repeated accusations-from organizations such as the United Nations-of maintaining connections with non-state actors to sway regional dynamics.

The repercussions of this strategy are becoming more apparent. Renewed hostilities along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, along with escalating militant violence, underscore the long-term dangers associated with such policies. Importantly, Pakistan’s heightened involvement on its western border during the ongoing Middle Eastern crisis has further limited its capacity-or willingness-to address Saudi security demands.

Even within multilateral settings, similar trends are observable. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has consistently placed Pakistan on its ‘grey list,’ pointing to shortcomings in combating terrorist financing. Although technical compliance has seen improvements, FATF assessments continue to reveal deficiencies in enforcement and institutional follow-through.

Shifting focus back to the Gulf context, the intersection of Saudi financial pressure, UAE repayment expectations, and Qatari visa limitations signifies a pivotal moment. These are not merely isolated policy choices but rather elements of a larger reevaluation of Pakistan’s dependability as a partner.

Pakistan’s hesitance to implement its commitments-despite a significant economic reliance on Gulf assistance-highlights a more profound structural challenge. Confronted with fiscal instability, domestic political limitations, and a complicated regional landscape, Islamabad seems increasingly inclined to favor short-term risk aversion over long-term strategic reliability.

Nevertheless, this strategy entails lasting repercussions. For Gulf nations, it prompts essential inquiries regarding the trustworthiness of Pakistan’s security guarantees. For the wider international community, it reinforces the view of Pakistan as a transactional player-engaged when it suits them, yet reluctant when obligations require concrete action.

In today’s world, where geopolitical relationships are increasingly influenced by trust and reliability, credibility has emerged as a vital strategic resource. Nations that reliably fulfill their obligations are more likely to establish enduring economic and security alliances. In contrast, those viewed as untrustworthy face the danger of being gradually sidelined.

The ongoing tensions with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are not just isolated incidents; they reflect a larger, ongoing trend. Pakistan’s task is not only to manage immediate challenges but also to confront the fundamental credibility gap that continues to affect its relationships with partners.