China’s distant-water fishing fleet under fire for alleged abuse and overfishing

China operates the world’s largest distant-water fishing (DWF) fleet, and its dominance in global fisheries has come at an increasingly unsustainable cost. With more than 16,000 active vessels—far exceeding the government’s official cap of 3,000—China's DWF footprint is massive, spanning virtually every oceanic region (Overseas Development Institute, 2020). These fleets are not merely fishing further afield; they are operating with poor transparency, inadequate oversight, and growing evidence of systemic labour and environmental abuses.

From an ecological standpoint, the destructive nature of China’s DWF operations is alarming. A 2025 report by Oceana found that Chinese-flagged vessels were responsible for 44% of all visible global industrial fishing activity between 2022 and 2024, with more than 110 million hours at sea (Oceana, 2025). Much of this effort focuses on resource-rich but ecologically sensitive areas in West Africa, the Pacific Islands, and Latin America—regions already under pressure from climate change and local overfishing.

China’s extensive use of bottom trawlers, which rake the ocean floor and destroy entire ecosystems, has drawn international condemnation. These trawlers—many of which operate under foreign flags to evade regulation—are responsible for long-term habitat destruction, coral reef collapse, and unsustainable bycatch rates. The ODI estimates that hundreds of Chinese trawlers are active in marine protected areas, either illegally or under murky bilateral access agreements where transparency is minimal (ODI, 2020).

In parallel with the ecological toll is a disturbing human cost. A series of investigations by the Environmental Justice Foundation and AP News have revealed patterns of labour exploitation aboard Chinese DWF vessels. A 2023 EJF report, based on interviews with over 100 Indonesian crew members, found that 99% experienced wage theft, 97% reported debt bondage, and 58% had witnessed or experienced physical abuse (EJF, 2023). These findings were not isolated incidents—they were systemic across multiple fleets and oceans.

Further reporting by Euronews Green described Chinese DWF ships as "floating prisons," with workers reporting 18–20 hour shifts, lack of medical care, and in some cases, being trapped at sea for over a year without proper contracts or legal recourse (Euronews, 2022). In one particularly egregious case, North Korean crew members were reportedly held aboard Chinese vessels for up to a decade, violating international sanctions and human rights law (AP News, 2023).

The exploitation is enabled and exacerbated by a lack of accountability. Chinese vessels frequently “go dark” by disabling their Automatic Identification Systems, particularly when fishing in sensitive areas like the Galápagos or off the coast of West Africa (India Today, 2025). In 89% of recent illegal fishing incidents recorded by EJF, the offending vessels were part of government-approved overseas fisheries projects. This suggests that Beijing’s distant-water policies are not only failing to prevent illegal activity—they may be institutionalizing it (EJF, 2023).

Beyond human rights and biodiversity loss, China’s DWF model undermines global food security. In many coastal African and Pacific nations, Chinese vessels extract fish that would otherwise feed local populations. According to SciDev.net, local artisanal fishers have seen dramatic drops in catch and income, as overfishing by foreign fleets—predominantly Chinese—depletes coastal stocks (SciDev, 2023). In countries lacking enforcement capacity, the playing field is severely tilted, allowing powerful foreign fleets to plunder with impunity.

Despite claims from Chinese authorities that their fleet operates under "strict regulation," the reality is a web of subsidies, loopholes, and weak enforcement. Fuel subsidies and generous vessel financing allow Chinese operators to profit even from unviable fisheries. Meanwhile, regulatory bodies like the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs consistently underreport fleet size and omit human rights violations from public disclosures (ODI, 2020). Beijing has stated it will reduce illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, but its words are not matched by robust domestic reforms or international cooperation.

To counter this destructive model, global institutions must enforce stronger port-state measures, demand transparency in vessel ownership, and condition market access on verified labour and sustainability standards. Countries importing Chinese-caught seafood—especially in the EU and U.S.—must enforce due diligence regulations that hold importers accountable for forced labour and IUU fishing.

To break this cycle will require coordinated, enforceable action: stronger port-state measures that deny services to vessels implicated in IUU fishing; mandatory, tamper-resistant vessel tracking and public ownership registries to unmask shell companies; independent at-sea observers and accessible grievance channels to protect crew; and trade measures that bar market access for seafood linked to forced labour or illegal catches. Importing states, retailers, and consumers must demand full chain-of-custody transparency and support capacity-building so coastal communities—not distant fleets—benefit from their marine resources. Only with these concrete, verifiable steps can international law, markets, and civil society turn rhetoric into real deterrence.

The evidence is overwhelming: China's distant-water fishing fleet is an engine of environmental destruction and labour exploitation. It is not merely a matter of poor oversight; the system is structurally flawed, fuelled by subsidies and legitimized by weak governance. As long as the fleet operates under these conditions, it will continue to devastate ecosystems, undermine food security, and trample human rights. If Beijing is serious about becoming a responsible maritime power, then it must radically reform its fishing policies—not just on paper, but in practice.